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The status of persons of Japanese ancestry in the 
United States and Canada during world war II: 
a tragedy in three parts* 
Edward G. H U D O N * * 
Dès l'attaque de Pearl Harbor par le Japon, le 7 décembre 1941, les 
Etats-Unss et le Canada ont toits deux pensé que leur sécurité était 
menacée par la présence de personnss d'origine et de descendance 
japonaises sur la côte du Pacifique, où existait déjà un fort sentiment 
anti-japonais. Les droits des individus paraissett avoir été tout à fait 
oubliés par ceux qui, dans les deux pays, furent chargés de remédier à 
cette situation plutôt imaginaire que réelle. Sans qu'il ne soit tenu compte 
de la nationalité et de la loyauté des personnes, tout un groupe ethnique a 
été ainsi obligé d'abandonner ses biens et placé deforce dans des centres 
de déteniion éloignés du foyer et du lieu de travail habituel. 
Aux États-Unis, ce déplacement massif fut le résultat ddExecutive 
Orders, de Relocation Orders et de Civilian Exclusion Orders. Au 
Canada, cette déportaiion fut décidée par ordres en conseil. La British 
Columbia Security Commission, composée de trois personne,, eut la 
responsabilité d'organiser et de diriger l'évacuation de toutes les person-
nes de race japonaise de certaines régions de la Colombie Britannique. 
Cette Commission eut à déterminrr le moment de l'évacuation, le mode 
de transpor,, l'endrott de déteniion, etc. . . 
Aux États-Unis, quatre-vingt-dix jours après que l'évacuation eut été 
entreprise sous surveillance militaire, 110,142 personnes avaient été 
déplacées à partir de certaines régions des Etats de Californie, de 
Washington, d'Oregon et d'Arizona. Au Canada, une fois que la Com-
mission de sécurité de la Colombie Britannique eut accompii son travail, 
* Cet article est extrait d'un chapitre d'une thèse soutenue à l'Université Laval au mois de 
mai 1976, pour l'obtention d'un doctorat en droit. 
** Professeur à la Faculté de droit de l'Université Laval, membre des barreaux de l'État 
du Maine, du District of Columbia et de la Cour suprême des États-Unis. 
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toutes les personnss d'origine et de descendance japonaises, soit environ 
21,000 personnes, avaient été repousséss à l'intérieur d'une bande de 
terre large de cent milles partant de la côte du Paciiique. 
Aux États-Unis, les Japonass purent contester ce déplacement pen-
dant qu'il eut lieu, avant la fin de la guerre. Au Canada, ce ne fut possible 
qu'après la guerre, et que relativement à la validité des ordres de 
déportation. 
Dans le cas des Etats-Unis, trois cas ont été examinés par la Cour 
suprême. Dans deux causes, Hirabayashi v. United States (1943) et 
Korematsu v. United States (1944), le pouvorr du Gouvernement des 
États-Unis d'agir ainsi en temps d'urgenee a été affirmé. Dans une 
troisième, Ex Parte Mitsuye Endo, l'idée que le Gouvernement peut 
dans ces circonstances détenir une personne loyale a été rejetée. Dans ce 
jugement le juge William O. Douglas a écrit : 
« Un citoyen reconnu comme fidèle ne pose aucun problème d'espionnage ou de 
sabotag.. La fidélité est une matière du cœur et de l'esprit, et non de race, de 
croyance, ou de couleur. Celui qui est fidèle n'est par définition ni espion ni 
saboteu.. Quand le pouvoir de détenir dérive du pouvoir de protéger l'effort de 
guerre de l'espionnage et du sabotag,, la déteniion qui n'a aucun rapport avec 
cet objectif est sans autorisation ». 
Au Canada, la Cour suprême s'est divisée sur la question de la 
validité de la déportaiion des épouses, des enfants de moins de seize ans et 
des sujets britanniques résidant au Canada. Le Consell privé fut toutefois 
d'avis que les ordres en consell devaient être envisagés dans leur ensem-
ble et qu'ils n'étaient pas ultra vires. 
D'un point de vue rétrospectif le traitement des Japonais-américains 
et des Japonais-canadiens pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale montre 
qu'en temps d'urgence, même l'homme raisonnabee et juste peut parfois 
oublier les droits d'autrui et agir d'une façon très éérange. 
Pages 
INTRODUCTION 63 
A — The mass arrest of an entire people 64 
1 ) Canada 64 
2) The United States 65 
B — Canada's 1939 Defence of Canada Regulations as a precedent 65 
HUDON The status of persons of Japanese ancestry . . . 63 
Pages 
PART I — The relocation of persons of Japanese ancestry—The United States 66 
A) The first step—the Executive Orders 66 
B) The second step—the Relocation Proclamations 67 
C) The third step—the Civilian Exclusion Orders 68 
D) The effect of the compulsory mass migration of Japanese-Americans 69 
PART II — The relocation of persons of Japanese ancestry—The Dominion of Canada 70 
A) The Declaration of a state of war between Canada and Japan 70 
B) The first Orders in Council affecting Japanese-Canadians 70 
C) The Relocation Orders in Council 71 
D) The British Columbia Security Commission 72 
E) The effect of the compulsory relocation of Japanese-Canadians 74 
PART III — The World War II Japanese-American and Japanese-Canadian questions 
in the courts 75 
A) The litigation in the American courts—the war-time Japanese-American cases 75 
I ) The Hirabayashi case 75 
2) The Koremalsu case 77 
3) The Endo case 79 
B) The Canadian litigation—The Japanese-Canadians and the end of the war . . . 81 
1) The National Emergency Transitional Powers Act, 1945 81 
2) The Deportation Orders 82 
3) The Supreme Court of Canada and the Orders in Council 83 
4) The Privy Council and the Orders in Council 84 
AFTERMATH AND CONCLUSION 88 
INTRODUCTION 
December 7, 1941, the date on which Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, 
was characterized by Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United 
States, as a date which would "live in infamy"1. Without a doubt, that 
date was, and perhaps still is, considered by both Japanese-Americans 
and Japanese-Canadians as one which unjustly cast them "in infamy". 
For, long before Pearl Harbor, anti-Japanese sentiment was rampant on 
the West Coasts of both the United States and Canada. Once Pearl Har-
bor had been attacked in the manner that it was, that event served to 
1. Address to the Congress of the United States, December 8, 1941, asking that a state of 
war be declared between the United States and Japan. Congressional Record, v. 87, 
Part 9, pp. 9504, 9505; The Public Papers and Addressss of Franklin D. RRooevelt, 
Compiled with Special Material and Explanatory Notes by Samuel I. Rosenman, New 
York, Harper & Brothers, 1950, 1941 volume, pp. 514-515. 
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intensify to no end an already unjust atmosphere of intolerance, suspi-
cion, and discrimination. In both the United States and Canada, Pearl 
Harbor caused anti-Japanese sentiment to be fanned to the point where 
concern for individual liberty appears to have been forgotten by those in 
authority as they dealt with a security problem which was imagined to 
exist. People of Japanese ancestry were summarily taken from their 
homes and deprived of their property as they were removed from West 
Coast areas in both the United States and Canada and placed in intern-
ment camps. In both countries, this was done regardless of nationality 
and without proof of the lack of loyalty to either the United States or 
Canada, as the case might be2. 
A. THE MASS ARREST OF AN ENTIRE PEOPLE 
1. Canada 
In Canada this was done by Orders in Council3; in the United States 
it was done by Executive Orders4. In both countries, the West Coast 
Japanese—men, women, and children—were taken into custody not be-
cause they had done something wrong, but because of the fear that they 
might. In effect, this amounted to the mass arrest of an entire people 
without indictment and without charges having been made against them. 
In the United States, over 100,000 people were uprooted and transported 
to camps where they were made to live under virtual prison conditions, 
far from their homes5. In Canada, approximately 21,000 people were 
involved, with some being moved from their homes on as little as 
twenty-four hours notice or less5. Basically, the only reason for this ac-
tion in both countries was that the military thought that it would take too 
long for individual loyalty investigations to be conducted7. 
2. For a discussion of what took place in Canada, see Forrest E. La Violette. The 
Canadian Japanese and World War II; A Sociological and Psychological Account, 
University of Toronto. 1948. For a critical account of the action taken by the Govern-
ment of the United States, as well as for citations to numerous other publications on 
the subject, see Eugene V. Rostow. "The Japanese American Cases—A Disaster. 
1945". 54 Yale Law Journal 489. 
3. See La Violette. Op. cit. supra note 2, Chap. 3. "Moving Time". 
4. See Rostow, Op. cit. supra note 2. In addition, see the Appendix to Final Report. 
Japaneee Evacuaiion from the West Coast, 1942, Washington. D.C., G.P.O., 1943. 
for memoranda, correspondence, and various documents that relate to the World 
War II relocation of the Japanese. 
5. Rostow, Op. cit. supra note 2. p. 490. 
6. La Violette, Op. cit. supra note 2. pp. 64-65. 
7. Rostow, Op. cit. supra note 2, p. 490. 
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2. The United States 
In the United States, on December 10, 1941, the President of the 
United States issued proclamations concerning Japanese, German, and 
Italian alien enemies setting forth the conduct to be observed and enjoin-
ing them8 
to preserve the peace towards the United States and to refrain from crime 
against the public safety, and from violating the laws of the United States and 
of the States and Territories thereof; and to refrain from actual hostility or 
giving information, aid or comfort to the enemies of the United States or inter-
fering by word or deed with the defense of the United States or the political 
process and public opinions thereof; and to comply strictly with the regulations 
which are hereby or which may be from time to time promulgated by the Presi-
dent. 
The Proclamation stated further that all alien enemies were liable to 
restraint or to give security, to removal from specified areas, or to de-
parture from the United States in the manner provided by law and as 
prescribed in regulations duly promulgated by the President9. The duties 
and the authority of the Attorney General of the United States and of the 
Secretary of War regarding the conduct and the movement of alien 
enemies within the continental United States, as well as in other areas 
within the jurisdiction of the United States, were set forth and regula-
tions issued10. 
B. CANADA'S 1939 DEFENCE OF CANADA REGULATIONS AS A PRECE-
DENT 
In essence, this was the same type of action which Canada had 
taken in 1939 at the start of World War II. At that time, 
sub-paragraph (7) of Regulation 24 of the Defence of Canada Regula-
tions provided that when these Regulations came into force, public 
notice of the fact would be given by Proclamation". Accordingly, in the 
Canada Gazette for September 12, 1939, it was stated that since the 
Regulations had come into force on September 3rd, public notice was 
given of Regulation number 24 which dealt with the arrest, detention, 
and internment of enemy aliens in Canada12. 
8. 6 Federal Register 6321 (Japanese), 6323 at 6324 (German), 6324-6325 (Italian). 
9. Ibid. 
10. Ibid., pp. 6321-6323, 6324, 6325. 
11. The Canada Gazette, Extra, September 13, 1939. 
12. Ibid. 
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The regulation stated that so long as they peacefully pursued their 
ordinary occupations, all enemy aliens in Canada would be allowed to 
continue to enjoy the protection of the law and would be accorded "the 
respect and consideration due to peaceful and law abiding citizens"13. 
The regulation provided further that they would not be arrested, de-
tained or interfered with, provided they complied with the requirements 
prescribed in the Regulation with respect to registration14, 
unless there [was] reasonable ground to believe that they [were] engaged in 
espionage, or [were] engaging or attempting to engage in acts of a hostile na-
ture, or [were] giving or attempting to give information to the enemy, or unless 
they otherwise contravene[d] any law, Order in Council, or Proclamation. 
The Proclamation set forth under what circumstances enemy aliens 
would be arrested and detained15, who had the power to effect the arrest 
and detention16, and under what conditions persons so arrested and de-
tained would be released17. Thus, the stage was set for the now 
lamented events which were to follow. 
PART I 
The Relocation of Persons of Japanese Ancestry 
The United States 
A. THE FIRST STEP—THE EXECUTIVE ORDERS 
In the United States, the first step toward the relocation of civilians 
was taken in an Executive Order dated February 19, 1942, which was 
filed February 21, 1942, and which was published in the Federal Regis-
ter of February 25, 194218. This was Executive Order No. 9066 which 
superseded designations by the Attorney General of prohibited and re-
stricted areas under the Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 194119. 
Executive Order 9066 authorized and directed the Secretary of War and 
the Military Commander whom he might from time to time designate "to 
prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the 
appropriate Military Commander [might] determine, from which any or 
all persons [might] be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of 
13. Ibid., Regulation 24(1). 
14. Ibid. 
15. Ibid., Regulation 24 (2). 
16. Ibid., Regulation 24 (3). 
17. Ibid., Regulation 24 (4). 
18. 7 Federal Register 1407. 
19. 6 Federal Register 6321, 6323, 6324. 
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any person to enter, remain in, or leave [should] be subject to whatever 
restrictions the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander 
[might] impose in his discretion"20. 
Following this, on March 20, 1942, there was the publication of Ex-
ecutive Order 9102 which established the War Relocation Authority in 
the Executive Office of the President, and defined its functions and 
duties21. The Executive Order provided for the appointment of a Direc-
tor of the Authority who would be responsible to the President. The 
Director was authorized and directed 
to formulate and effectuate a program for the removal, from the areas desig-
nated from time to time by the Secretary of War or appropriate military com-
mander under the authority of Executive Order No. 9066 of February 19, 1942, 
of the persons or classes of persons designated under such Executive Order. 
and for their relocation, maintenance, and supervision. 
On March 21, 1942, Executive Order 9066 was ratified and con-
firmed by the Act of March 21, 1942, which made it a misdemeanor 
punishable by fine and/or imprisonment for one to22 
enter, remain in, leave, or commit any act in any military area or military zone 
prescribed, under the authority of an Executive order of the President, by the 
Secretary of War. or by any military commander designated by the Secretary of 
War, contrary to the restrictions applicable to any such area or zone or con-
trary to the order of the Secretary of War or any such military commander. . . . 
if it appealed] that he knew or should have known of the existence and extent 
of the restrictions or order and that his act was in violation thereof. 
B. T H E SECOND S T E P — T H E RELOCATION PROCLAMATIONS 
Executive Order 9102 was implemented by a series of Public Proc-
lamations which were issued by General J. L. De Witt, Commanding 
General of the Western Defense Command. The first of these dated 
March 2, 1942, filed March 25, 1942, and published in the Federal Regis-
ter of March 26, 1942 applied to any "Japanese, German, Italian alien, 
or any person of Japanese Ancestry" who was a resident of Military 
Areas Nos. 1 and 2 which encompassed all or parts of the States of 
Washington, Oregon, California, Montana, Idaho, Nevada, Utah, and 
Arizona, and the Territory of Alaska23. The Proclamation stated that 
such persons or classes of persons as the situation might require, would, 
by subsequent proclamation, be excluded from Military Area No. 1 and 
20. 7 Federal Register 1407. 
21. 7 Federal Register 2165. 
22. 56 Stat. 173 (1942). 
23. 7 Federal Register 2320, 2321 (Emphasis added). 
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from certain zones of Military Area No. 2. The Proclamation required 
any "Japanese, German or Italian alien, or any person of Japanese An-
cestry",, a resident of Military Zone 1 who changed his habitual place of 
residence to execute a "Change of Residence Notice" at a United States 
Post Office24. The Proclamation also adopted and continued in full force 
and effect the designation of prohibited areas made by the Attorney 
General of the United States under the Proclamations of December 7 
and 8, 1941, as well as the instructions, rules, and regulations prescribed 
by him. 
There were other Public Proclamations. Thus, a second one dated 
March 16, 1942, filed March 27, 1942, and published in the Federal Re-
gister of March 28, 1942, added four more Military areas—Nos. 3, 4, 5 
and 6 encompassing the entire States of Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and 
Utah—"from which any or all persons m[ight] be excluded, and with 
respect to which the rights of any persons to enter, remain in, or leave 
s[hould] be subject to whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the 
appropriate Military Commander m[ight] impose in his discretion"25. 
There was a third Public Proclamation dated March 24, 1942, filed 
April 1, 1942, and published in the Federal Register of April 2, 1942, 
which imposed a curfew on all Japanese, German and Italien aliens, and 
on all persons of Japanese ancestry living or working within substan-
tially all of the six Military areas. Also, this proclamation forbade per-
sons of Japanese ancestry from having in their possession, using, or 
operating within these six Military areas any of the following: firearms, 
weapons or implements of war or component parts thereof, ammunition 
bombs explosives or component parts thereof short-wave radio receiv-
ing sets having certain frequencies radio transmitting sets signal de-
vices codes or ciphers and cameras26 
C THE THIRD S T E P — T H E CIVILIAN EXCLUSION ORDERS 
In addition to the Public Proclamations issued by the Commanding 
General of the Western Defense Command, there were also Civilian Ex-
clusion Orders. Thus, Exclusion Order No. 24 excluded persons of 
Japanese ancestry from the countries of Contra Costa, San Joaquin, and 
Alameda, California27. Nos. 25 and 26 excluded persons of Japanese an-
cestry from portions of Multnomah County, Oregon28; Nos. 32 and 33 
24. Ibid., p. 2321 (Emphasis added). 
25. 7 Federal Register 2405. 
26. 7 Federal Register 2543, 2545. 
27. 7 Federal Register 3966. 
28. Ibid. 
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excluded persons of Japanese ancesty from portions of the City of Los 
Angeles29; No. 34 from portions of Alameda County, California30; 
No. 35 excluded them from the County of San Mateo, California31; 
Nos. 36 and 37 excluded them from portions of the City of Seattle, 
Washington32; and No. 36 from certain portions of the State of 
Arizona33. 
L). THE EFFECT OF THE COMPULSORY MASS MIGRATION JAPANESE-
AMERICANS 
Once the evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry from the West 
Coast of the United States was undertaken, within a period of ninety 
operating days 110,442 persons had been subjected to a compulsory or-
ganized mass migration which was conducted under military super-
vision34. This involved the establishment of Assembly Centers. In some 
instances, fairgrounds or race tracks were used; in others, abandoned 
Civilian Conservation Corps camps, the Pacific Live Stock Exposition 
facilities, old mill sites, or migrant camps served the purpose35. It also 
involved the construction and the equipment of Relocation Centers. In 
all, there were ten of these located in Utah, Arizona, Colorado, Wyom-
ing, Arkansas, California, and Oregon36. 
All of this was done in spite of the fact that on the West Coast of the 
United States there were no instances of sabotage by persons of 
Japanese ancestry and in spite of the fact that the courts were open and 
in full and free operation. No such measures were taken in Hawai with 
respect to persons of Japanese ancestry although they comprised 32% of 
the population as against 1.2% on the West Coast, and although access 
to military installations were substantially the same in both areas37. 
29. Ibid., pp. 3966, 3967. 
30. Ibid., p. 3967. 
31. Ibid., pp. 3967, 3968. 
32. Ibid., p. 3968. 
33. Ibid., pp. 3968, 3969. 
34. Final Report, Japanese Evacuation From the West Coast, 1942, Washington. D.C., 
G. P. O., 1943, p. viii. 
35. Ibid., Chap. XIII, "Assembly Center Location, Construction and Equipment." 
36. Ibid., Chap. XXI, "The Construction and Equipment of Relocation Centers." For the 
exact location and the description of the Centers, see pp. 249-264. 
37. Rostow, Op. cit. supra note 2. pp. 496, 497. 
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PART II 
Relocation of Persons of Japanese Ancestry 
The Dominion of Canada 
A. THE DECLARATION OF A STATE OF WAR BETWEEN CANADA AND 
JAPAN 
In Canada, on December 7, 1941, by Order in Council the Privy 
Council took note of the fact that on that day Japan had "wantonly and 
treacheously attacked British territory and British forces, and also Unit-
ted States territory and United States forces; that Japan's actions [were] 
a threat to the defence and freedom of Canada and other nations of the 
British Commonwealth; . . . that it [was] expedient that a proclamation 
should be issued declaring the existence of a state of war between 
Canada and Japan"38. On the following day, December 8, such a proc-
lamation was issued which declared and proclaimed that war existed and 
had existed between Canada and Japan "as and from the 7th day of 
December, 1941"39. 
B. THE FIRST ORDERS IN COUNCIL AFFECTING JAPANESE-CANADIANS 
On December 7, 1941, by Order in Council the Defence of Canada 
Regulations (Consolidation) 1941 were amended to require the registra-
tion of persons of Japanese nationality by extending the provisions of 
Regulations 24, 25, and 26 to them40. On December 16, 1941, by another 
Order in Council persons of the Japanese race sixteen years or older 
who resided anywhere in Canada were ordered to register with the 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police41. This was an extension to the entire 
country of an order dated January 7, 1941, which had required that per-
sons of the Japanese race who were residents of British Columbia regis-
ter with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police42. 
Another Order in Council dated December 16, 1941, prohibited the 
operation of any vessel in waters adjacent to the West Coast of Canada 
"without the authority in writing of the Commissioner of the Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police, or other officer designated by him for the 
38. P. C. 9592, Proclamaiions and Orders in Council Relating to the War, Ottawa, King's 
Printer. 1942, v. 5, pp. 349, 350. 
39. Ibid., p. 350. 
40. P. C. 9591, Ibid., pp. 348, 349. 
41. P. C. 9760, Ibid., p. 359. 
42. Ibid. 
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purpose"43. Any vessel operated in violation of this Order was subject 
to seizure and detention, and any person who contravened the Order 
was, on summary conviction, subject to fine and imprisonment44. 
Then, by an Order in Council dated January 13, 1942, persons of 
Japanese racial origin were prohibited from serving on fishing vessels off 
the Coast of British Columbia or from holding fishing licenses45. On 
January 31, 1942, this was followed by an Order in Council which consti-
tuted a committee for the disposal and putting back into service of some 
1,100 Japanese fishing vessels worth between two and three million dol-
lars which had been impounded46. Although this was justified as a war 
measure that had been taken for reasons of the national defence and 
security of Canada, it was but one chapter in a long standing history of 
anti-Japanese feeling and agitation in the fishing industry of British Col-
umbia. It involved the taking of property of Japanese-Canadians who 
were citizens of Canada47. 
C. THE RELOCATION ORDERS IN COUNCIL 
Next, there was the Order in Council amending and rescinding De-
fence of Canada Regulation 4, and replacing it with a new Regulation 
which established "protected areas" from which not only enemy aliens 
could be removed, but which also authorized48 
the detention of any persons, other than enemy aliens, ordinarily resident or 
actually present in such protected area in order to prevent such persons from 
acting in any manner prejudicial to the public safety of the State. 
Dated January 16, 1942, and published in the Canada Gazette, 
Extra, of January 27, 1942, it was soon followed by an Order in Council 
dated February 17, 1942, which authorized the formation of a Canadian 
Construction Corps49, and by another one dated February 19, 1942, 
which authorized the establishment of work camps for enemy aliens who 
were removed from British Columbia50. 
43. P. C. 9761, Ibid., p. 367. 
44. Ibid. 
45. P. C. 251, Ibid., v. 6, pp. 33, 34. 
46. P. C. 288, Ibid., v. 6, pp. 35, 36. 
47. See La Violette, Op. cit. supra note 2, Chap. 9, "The Fishing Boats", pp. 203-208. 
48. P. C. 365 dated 16th day of January, 1942, and published in the Canada Gazette, Extra, 
27th January, 1942; Proclamations and Orders in Council Relating to the War, hoc. 
cit. supra note 36, v. 6, pp. 44, 45. 
49. Ibid., pp. 120-122. Actually, the effect of this Order in Council was deferred by a later 
order in Council dated March 31, 1942, P. C. 2542, Ibid., p. 259. 
50. Ibid., pp. 125, 126. 
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Three other Orders in Council, P. C. 1457 and P. C. 1486, dated 
February 24, 194251, and P. C. 1665, dated March 4, 1942s", effectively 
settled the fate of Japanese-Canadians for the duration of the War and 
even longer. The first, P. C. 1457, amended the Defence of Canada Regu-
lations by adding Regulation 39E which provided that after the date of the 
Regulation and for the duration of the War, no person of the Japanese 
race and no Japanese company would have the capacity "to acquire or 
hold land or growing crops in Canada"53. The Minister of Justice could, 
however, grant to a person of the Japanese race or to a Japanese company 
a licence to acquire or hold land or growing crops "if it appeared to him to 
be in the public interest so to do"54. 
The second of these Orders in Council, P. C. 1486, amended 
Regulation 4 of the Defence of Canada Regulations (Consolidation 1941) 
by arming the Minister of Justice with the authority to require any and all 
persons to leave protected areas, and granting him authority "to prohibit 
any or all persons from entering, leaving, or returning to such protected 
area except as permitted pursuant to such order"55. The Order also 
granted the Minister of Justice the power to impose on any and all 
persons resident or present in a protected area "such restrictions as 
[might] be specified in the order in respect of their employment or busi-
ness, their movements or places of residence, their associations or com-
munications with other persons, their activities in relation to the dissemi-
nation of news or the propagation of opinions or otherwise with respect to 
the conduct of any such persons"56. The Minister could also prohibit or 
restrict such persons in the possession or use of specified articles, and he 
could57 
authorize the detention, in such place and under such conditions as he [might] 
from time to time direct, of any or all persons ordinarily resident or actually 
present in such protected area. 
D. THE BRITISH COLUMBIA SECURITY COMMISSION 
The third of these Orders in Council, P. C. 1665, established regula-
tions respecting a three-member Commission to be known as the British 
51. Ibid., pp. 135, 136, 137. 
52. Ibid., pp. 167-171. 
53. Regulation 39 E (1), P. C. 1457, Ibid., p. 135. 
54. Regulation 39 E (4)(a). 
55. P. C. 1486, Proclamations and Orders in Council Relating to the War, Loc. cit. supra 
note 36, v. 6, pp. 136, 137. The Order substituted a new paragraph 2 for the old 
paragraph 2 of Regulation 4. 
56. Ibid. 
57. Ibid., 2(e). 
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Columbia Security Commission which would have the duty "to plan, 
supervise and direct the-evacuation from the protected areas of British 
Columbia of all persons of the Japanese race"58. The Commission had the 
duty to determine "the time and order of the evacuation of such persons, 
the mode of transport and all matters relative to the placement of such 
persons"59. Moreover, it had the responsibility to provide "for the hous-
ing, feeding, care and protection of such persons in so far as the same 
[might] be necessary"60. The Order provided further61: 
II. (1) The Commission shall have power to require by order any person 
of the Japanese race, in any protected area in British Columbia, to remain at his 
place of residence or to leave his place of residence and proceed to any other 
place within or without the protected area at such time and in such manner as the 
Commission may prescribe in such order, or to order the detention of any such 
person, and any such order may be enforced by any person nominated by the 
Commission so to do. 
(2) The Commission may make orders respecting the conduct, activities 
and discipline of any person evacuated under the provisions of these Regula-
tions. 
The Order stipulated that persons of the Japanese race evacuated 
from a protected area could voluntarily turn over property located in such 
an area to the Custodian provided for by the 1939 Regulations respecting 
Trading with the Enemy. It also provided that property which a person of 
the Japanese race could not take along with him when he was evacuated 
should be vested in, and be subject to, the control of this Custodian62. 
Property, rights, and interests so vested in and made subject to the con-
trol and management qf the Custodian, or the proceeds thereof, were to 
be dealt with "in such manner as the Governor in Council [might] 
direct"63. 
Another succession of Orders in Council completed the British Col-
umbia Security Commission's control throughout Canada over the 
movement, the employment, and the residence of persons of Japanese 
residence or ancestry. P. C. 2483, dated March 27, 1942, amended P. C. 
1665 by granting the Commission greater "protective control" over per-
sons of the Japanese race which was defined to mean "any person of the 
Japanese race required to leave any protected area of British Columbia by 
Order of the Minister of Justice under Regulation 4, as amended, of the 
58. P. C. 1665, Ibid., p. 167 at 169. 
59. Ibid. 
60. Ibid. 
61. Ibid. 
62. Ibid., Section 12, "Custody of Japanese Property". 
63. Ibid. 
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Defence of Canada Regulations (Consolidation) 1941 "64. P. C. 2541, 
dated March 30, 1942, empowered the Commission to issue relief to indi-
gent persons of the Japanese race, to provide public employment for 
them, and to arrange for the care of their dependents65. 
Then, P. C. 3213, dated April 21, 1942, gave the Commission author-
ity to enter into agreements with the Government of any Province relative 
to the placement in such Province of persons of the Japanese race who 
were evacuated from the protected areas of British Columbia under the 
provisions of the Regulations66. Finally, P. C. 8173, dated September 11, 
1942, amended P. C. 1348 which established work camps for Japanese 
Nationals by extending its provisions to other persons of Japanese racial 
origins67. 
fc.. THE EFFECT OF THE COMPULSORY RELOCATION OF JAPANESE-
CANADIANS 
The relocation of Japanese-Canadians took place very much in the 
same manner that the relocation of Japanese-Americans did in the United 
States, except for the fact that there were fewer of the former than there 
were of the latter—about 21,000 as against over 100,000. In Canada as in 
the United States, there was a staging area. That was the Hastings Park 
Exhibition Grounds at Vancouver which served as the assembly point 
through which most of those relocated passed as they were sent to various 
places in the interior. Until better facilities could be prepared at the Park, 
even women and children were made to live in inadequately prepared 
livestock buildings68. 
By the time the British Columbia Security Commission had com-
pleted its work, all persons of Japanese origin or ancestry had been 
cleared from a strip of Canada's West Coast which was 100 miles wide. 
Some were sent to road camp projects, some to sugar-beet or other spe-
cial projects; others were kept in detention or sent to internment camps69. 
Former mining and ghost towns were used, as well as other facilities. In 
some instances, families were kept together, in others they were not when 
men were sent to road camps70. 
64. P. C. 2483, Ibid., pp. 252. 253. 
65. P. C. 2541, Ibid., p . 258. 
66. P. C. 3213, amending P. C. 1665, Ibid., v. 7, p. 34. 
67. P. C. 8173, amending P. C. 1348, Ibid., v. 8, pp. 170, 171. 
68. See La Violette, Op. cit. supra note 2, p . 63 et seq., "Hastings Park". 
69. For a breakdown of what was done with the evacuees, see Ibid., p . 96. 
70. Ibid., Chap. 5, "Interior Settlements". 
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PART III 
The World War II Japanese-American and Japanese-
Canadian Questions in the Courts 
Thus, during World War II the experience of the Japanese-
Canadians was in many ways very similar to that of the Japanese-
Americans. In one respect, however, there was a marked difference. The 
Japanese-Americans could contest the action that the American Govern-
ment took toward them at the time it occurred even though the War had 
not ended71. On the other hand, as long as the War continued there was 
nothing that the Japanese-Canadians could do. They had to wait until the 
War had ended before they could bring any form of court action. And 
even then, they could not contest the validity of the war-time course of 
action which the Canadian Government had followed under the authority 
of the War Measures Act. All that they could do was to contest the 
validity of an extension beyond the end of hostilities of the war-inspired 
actions of the Canadian Government which could find support only in the 
fact that they were war-time measures72. 
The litigation which took place in both the United States and Canada 
over this war-related treatment of citizens of Japanese ancestry gives 
emphasis to the difference that exists between the systems of government 
of the two countries. It also lends support to the assertion that a Bill of 
Rights—even one which is entrenched as is that of the United States 
Constitution—often does not suffice. 
A . THE LITIGATION IN THE AMERICAN COURTS—THE 
WAR-TIME JAPANESE-AMERICAN CASES 
1. The Hirabayashi Case 
Hirabayashi v. United States33 was the first World War II 
Japanese-American case to reach the Supreme Court of the United 
States. It was argued on May 10 and 11, 1943, and was decided on June 21 
of the same year. It involved a violation of the curfew provisions of 
Executive Order No. 906674 which had been ratified and confirmed by the 
71. For the American cases see Rostow, Op. cit. supra note 2. 
72. The one Canadian Supreme Court case is discussed by La Violette, Op. cit. supra 
note 2, Chap. XI, "The Supreme Court Case" . 
73. (1943) 320 U.S. 81. 
74. Loc. cit. supra note 19. 
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Act of March 21, 19427S. Two questions were presented. The first was 
whether the 8:00 p. m. to 6:00 a. m. curfew restriction, which applied 
only to persons of Japanese ancestry, was adopted by the Military Com-
mander in the exercise of an unconstitutional delegation by Congress of 
its legislative power. The second was whether the restriction unconstitu-
tionally discriminated between citizens of Japanese ancestry and those of 
other ancestries, in violation of the Fifth Amendment76. 
The appellant had violated the curfew order. Also, he had ignored a 
Civilian Exclusion Order and had failed to report to the Civil Control 
Station of a designated area to register for evacuation from the military 
area. It was brought out in his defense that he was an American citizen by 
birth who had never been a subject of, nor borne allegiance to, the Empire 
of Japan; that he was educated in the public schools of the State of 
Washington and was a senior at the University of Washington at the time 
of his arrest; that he had neither ever been to Japan nor ever had any 
association with Japanese residing there. His parents had come to the 
United States from Japan, but had never returned there. 
In an opinion written by Mr. Chief Justice Stone, the Court held that 
it was within the constitutional authority of the Congress and of the Chief 
Executive to prescribe the curfew order as an emergency war measure; 
that the order did not unconstitutionally discriminate against persons of 
Japanese ancestry; and that at the time and in the manner in which it was 
applied, the curfew order was within the boundaries of the war power. 
As it arrived at its decision, the Court reviewed the events which 
surrounded the issuance of the curfew order—Pearl Harbor and its after-
math. And in the light of the conditions with which the President and the 
Congress were confronted in the early months of 1942, the challenged 
orders were upheld as valid defense measures, the purpose of which was 
to safeguard the military area in question from the danger of sabotage and 
espionage at a time of threatened air raids and invasion by Japanese 
forces. As for the fact that the order was directed only at persons of 
Japanese ancestry, the Chief Justice wrote for the Court77: 
Whatever views we may entertain regarding the loyalty to this country of the 
citizens of Japanese ancestry, we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the 
military authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal members of that 
population, whose number and strength could not be precisely and quickly ascer-
tained. We cannot say that the war-making branches of the Government did not 
have ground for believing that in a critical hour such persons could not readily be 
75. Loc. cit. supra note 22. 
76. Loc. cit. supra note 73, p. 83. 
77. Ibid., p. 99. 
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isolated and separately dealt with, and constituted a menace to the national 
defense and safety, which demanded that prompt and adequate measures be 
taken to guard against it. 
As for the claim that the order was in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment because it discriminated against citizens of Japanese ancestry, the 
Court disposed of that with the statement: "The Fifth Amendment con-
tains no equal protection clause and it restrains only such discriminatory 
legislation by Congress as amounts to a denial of due process. . . Con-
gress may hit at a particular danger where it is seen, without providing for 
others which are not so evident or so urgent". Then the Court recognized 
that "legislative classification or discrimination based on race alone has 
often been held to be a denial of equal protection"78. But in the light of the 
facts, the circumstances, and the war setting in which the order was 
issued, it could not say that there was no ground for differentiating citi-
zens of Japanese ancestry from other groups in the United States. The 
fact alone that the shores of the United States were threatened by Japan 
rather than by another enemy power, the Court held, "set these citizens 
apart from others who h]ad] no particular associations with Japan"79. The 
Court continued80: 
We cannot close our eyes to the fact, demonstrated by experience, that in time of 
war residents having ethnic affiliations with an invading enemy may be a greater 
source of danger than those of a different ancestry. Nor can we deny that Con-
gress, and the military authorities acting with its authorization, have constitu-
tional power to appraise the danger in the light of facts of public notoriety. 
2. The Korematsu Case. 
Although Justices Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge wrote concurring 
opinions in Hirabayashi v. United States, the decision of the Court still 
had the support of a unanimous Court. But that was not the case in 
Korematsu v. United States*1, argued and decided the latter part of 1944, 
in which an order excluding Japanese-Americans from a Military Area 
was upheld. In that case there were three dissents: one by Justice 
Roberts82, one by Justice Murphy83, and one by Justice Jackson84. 
The petitioner in the case, a person of Japanese ancestry whose 
loyalty to the United States was not questioned, had been convicted of 
78. Ibid., p. 100. 
79. Ibid., p. 101. 
80. Ibid., pp. 101, 102. 
81. (1944) 323 U.S. 214. 
82. Ibid., p. 225. 
83. Ibid., p. 233. 
84. Ibid., p. 242. 
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violating Exclusion Order No. 34, dated May 3, 194285, which was issued 
pursuant to Executive Order 906686. As in the case of Hirabayashi, the 
prosecution of the petitioner and his conviction were founded on the 
provisions of the Act of March 21, 194287, which ratified and confirmed 
Executive Order 9066, and provided penalties for violations of orders and 
proclamations issued pursuant to it. The Order which the petitioner had 
violated excluded all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-
alien, from described portions of Military Area No. 1. 
Not only did the petitioner challenge the assumptions on which the 
Court had rested its conclusions m Hirabayashi, but he also urged that by 
May, 1942, when the Order in question was promulgated, all danger of the 
invasion of the West Coast of the United States had disappeared. As it 
rejected the petitioner's contentions, the Court repeated what it had said 
in Hirabayashi—that it could not reject as unfounded the judgment of the 
military authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal members of 
the country's Japanese population "whose number and strength could not 
be precisely and quickly ascertained"88. 
The exclusion of those of Japanese origin from the Military area was, 
like the curfew of the Hirabayashi case, deemed necessary because of the 
presence of an unascertained number of disloyal members of the group, 
most of which the Court had no doubt was loyal to the United States. As 
in the earlier case, it was because of this that the Court could not reject 
the finding of the military that "it was impossible to bring about an im-
mediate segregation of the disloyal from the loyal"89. And in support of 
this finding, the Court pointed out that subsequent to the exclusion, it had 
been confirmed that there were members of the group who retained loyal-
ties to Japan. Some 5,000 Américain citizens of Japanese ancestry refused 
to swear unqualified allegiance to the United States and renounce al-
legiance to the Japanese Emperor. Indeed, several thousand of the 
evacuees had requested repatriation to Japan. 
As it upheld the exclusion order as of the time it was made as well as 
of when the petitioner violated it, the Court was mindful of the hardship 
that this imposed on a large group of Americans. However, it justified this 
with the statement90: 
85. 7 Federal Register 3967. 
86. Loc. cit. supra note 19. 
87. Loc. cit. supra note 22. 
88. Loc. cit. supra note 81, p . 218. 
89. Ibid., p. 219. 
90. Ibid., pp. 219,220. 
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But hardships are part of war, and war is an aggregation of hardships. All citizens 
alike, both in and out of uniform, feel the impact of war in greater or lesser 
measure. Citizenship has its responsibilities as well as its privileges, and in time 
of war the burden is always heavier. Compulsory exclusion of large groups of 
citizens from their homes, except under circumstances of direct emergency and 
peril, is inconsistent with our basic governmental institutions. But when under 
conditions of modern warfare our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the 
power to protect must be commensurate with the threatened danger. 
3. The Endo Case. 
A third case, Ex Parte Mitsuye Endo91, which was decided on the 
same date that Korematsu was, came to the Supreme Court on a certifi-
cate of the Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit. Certain questions of law 
were certified and, according to the procedure set forth in Title 28, Unit-
ed States Code, § 346 (now § 1254), instructions were asked for the 
decision of the case. The opinion of the Court was written by Mr. Justice 
Douglas. 
Again the case involved an American citizen of Japanese ancestry, a 
woman who was evacuated from Sacramento, California, in 1942 under 
the authority granted by Executive Orders 9066 and 910292. The appellant 
was one of those subject to Civilian Exclusion Order No. 52, dated 
May 7, 1942 which excluded from Sacramento "all persons of Japanese 
ancestry, both alien and non-alien", beginning on May 16, 194293. On 
May 15, 1942, she was evacuated to the Sacramento Assembly Center, 
and on June 19, 1942, she was sent to the Tule Lake Relocation Center. 
Civilian Restrictive Order No. 1, dated May 19, 194294, applied to 
Assembly Centers, and Public Proclamation No. 8, dated June 27, 194295, 
applied to Relocation Centers. The former required all persons sent to 
Assembly Centers to remain within their bounds unless specifically au-
thorized to leave. The latter placed restrictions on the right of persons of 
Japanese Ancestry to enter, remain in, or leave Relocation Centers. Fail-
ure to conform to the provisions of Public Proclamation No. 8 made one 
subject to the penalties prescribed by the Act of March 21, 194296. Later, 
by a letter dated August 11, 1942, the War Relocation Authority was 
authorized to issue permits "for ingress to and egress from" War Reloca-
91. (1944) 323 U.S. 283. 
92. Loc. cit. supra notes 19 and 21. 
93. 7 Federal Register 3559, 3560. 
94. 7 Federal Register 982. 
95. 8 Federal Register 8346. 
96. Loc. cit. supra note 22. 
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tion Project Areas such as that at Tule Lake to which the appellant was 
sent97. 
There were three main features to the program of the War Relocation 
Authority: (1) there was the maintenance of Relocation Centers as interim 
places of residence for evacuees; (2) there was the segregation of loyal 
from disloyal evacuees: (3) the continued detention of the disloyal and, to 
the extent possible, the relocation of those found to be loyal98. And in so 
far as those who were found loyal under the third feature of the 
Authority's program were concerned, a procedure was established so that 
they could obtain leave from the Relocation Centers. But even if a person 
found loyal applied for leave, certain conditions had to be met such as the 
availability of employment which had to be approved by the Authority, 
the availability of personal financial resources with which the applicant 
could take care of himself or herself, the approval by a Relocation Officer 
of the Place where the applicant planned to live if granted leave, etc. But 
even if an applicant satisfied all of the conditions and requirements of 
which there were 14" leave could still be denied if it was determined that 
the proposed place of residence was in a locality where "community sen-
timent [was] unfavorable" was in an area which had not been cleared for 
relocation or if the area was one which had been closed by the Authority 
to the issuance of indefinite leave100 
The appellant was granted leave clearance on August 16, 1943, but 
she did not make application for indefinite leave. Instead, she petitioned 
for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that she was a loyal and law-abiding 
citizen of the United States against whom no charge had been made, that 
she was unlawfully detained, and that she was confined in the Relocation 
Center under guard and against her will. All of this was conceded by both 
the Department of Justice and by the War Relocation Authority. Yet, 
these agencies of the Government maintained that detention for an addi-
tional period even after clearance for leave had been granted was an 
essential step in the evacuation program. In support of this it was argued 
that there had to be an orderly relocation to avoid a dangerously disorded 
migration of unwanted people to unprepared communities that unsuper-
vised evacuation could result in hardship and disorder101. 
97. Final Repor,, Japaneee Evacuaiion from the West Coast, 1942, Loc. cit. supra 
note 34, p. 530. 
98. Loc. cit. supra note 91, p. 291. 
99. Ibid., pp. 292, 293. 
100. Ibid., p. 293. 
101. Ibid., pp. 296,297. 
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The Court would have none of this. It held that the appellant should 
be given her liberty for the simple reason that the War Relocation Author-
ity had no authority to subject concededly loyal citizens to its leave pro-
cedure, regardless of what other authority it may have had to detain other 
classes of citizens. In the words of the Court102: 
A citizen who is concededly loyal presents no problem of espionage or sabotage. 
Loyalty is a matter of the heart and mind, not of race, creed or color. He who is 
loyal is by definition not a spy or a saboteur. When the power to detain is derived 
from the power to protect the war effort against espionage and sabotage, deten-
tion which has no relationship to that objective is unauthorized. 
Nor may the power to detain an admittedly loyal citizen or to grant him a 
conditional release be implied as a useful or convenient step in the evacuation 
program, whatever authority might be implied in case of those whose loyalty was 
not conceded or established. If we assume (as we do) that the regional evacua-
tion was justified, its lawful character was derived from the fact that it was an 
espionage and sabotage measure, not that there was community hostility to this 
group of American citizens. The evacuation program rested explicitly on the 
former ground not on the latter as the underlying legislation shows. The author-
ity to detain a citizen or to grant him a conditional release as protection against 
espionage or sabotage is exhausted at least when his loyalty is conceded. If we 
held that the authority to detain continued thereafter, we would transform an 
espionage or sabotage measure into something else. 
B. THE CANADIAN LITIGATION—THE JAPANESE-CANADIANS 
AND THE END OF THE WAR 
1. The National Emergenyy Transitional Powers Act, 1945. 
After the hostilities of World War II had ended, the Parliament of 
Canada took measures to continue some of the powers that the Governor 
in Council had exercised during the War under the authority of the War 
Measures Act. It enacted the National Emergenyy Transitional Powers 
Act, 1945103, which authorized the Governor in Council to "do and au-
thorize such acts and things, and make from time to time such orders and 
regulations, as he [might], by reason of the continued existence of the 
national emergency arising out of the war against Germany and Japan, 
deem necessary or advisable" for certain specified purposes104. The Act 
provided that all orders and regulations made under it and while it con-
tinued in force, together with the orders and regulations made under 
102. Ibid., p. 302. 
103. An Act to confer certain transitional powers upon the Governor in Council during the 
National Emergency arising out of the War, 9-10 George VI, Chap. 205, Assented to 
18th December, 1945. 
104. Ibid., p. 2. 
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and pursuant to the War Measures Act, should be deemed to be 
regulations105. 
By its terms, the Act was to take effect January 1, 1946, after which 
date, for the purposes of the War-Measures Act, the war against Germany 
and Japan should be deemed no longer to exist106. The Act was to expire 
on December 31, 1946, unless addresses were presented to the 
Governor-General by the Senate and the House of Commons praying that 
it continue in force longer, in which case it could be extended but not for 
more than one year107. 
2. The Deportation Orders. 
After the war had been declared ended, action was taken to carry out 
the provisions of three Orders in Council for the deportation of 
Japanese-Canadians, Japanese Nationals who were residents of Canada, 
and the wives and children of such Japanese-Canadians and Japanese 
Nationals. The three Orders in Council, Numbers 7355, 7356, and 7357, 
were made under the authority of the War Measures Act. They were 
dated December 15, 1945, sixteen days before the National Emergency 
Transitional Powers Acts, 1945, took effect and the War declared ended. 
The first order authorized the Minister of Labour to order deported 
to Japan the following108: 
(1) Every person sixteen years of age or older, other than a Canadian 
National, who was a national of Japan resident in Canada and who (a) had, since 
the date of the declaration of war against Japan on December 8, 1941, made a 
request for repatriation; or, (b) had been in detention under certain regulations 
and still was detained on September 1, 1945. 
(2) Every naturalized British subject of the Japanese race of sixteen years 
or over resident in Canada who had made a request for repatriation, provided 
that such person had not revoked such a request in writing prior to midnight, 
September 1, 1945. 
(3) Every natural born British subject of the Japanese race of sixteen years 
of age or over resident of Canada who had made a request for repatriation, 
provided that such person had not revoked in writing such request prior to the 
making of an order for deportation by the Minister. 
(4) The wife and the Children under sixteen years of age of a person for 
whom the Minister of Labour made an order for deportation. 
105. Ibid., Section 2 (2). 
106. Ibid., Section 5. 
107. Ibid., Section 6. 
108. For the full text of Order in Council 7355, see Reference as to the Validity of Orders in 
Council of 15th Day of December, 1945 {P. C. 73555 7356, ,nd d357), in Relation to 
Persons of The Japanese Race, [1946] S.C.R., 248, 254-257. 
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The second Order, No. 7356, provided that any person, "being a 
British subject by naturalization under the Naturalization Act, 
Chapter 138, R.S.C. 1927", who was deported from Canada under the 
provisions of Order in Council P. C. 7355, should as and from the date 
upon which he left Canada in the course of such deportation "cease to be 
either a British subject or a Canadian national"109. 
The Third Order, No. 7357, provided for a Commission to inquire 
into "the activities, loyalty, and the extent of co-operation with the 
Government of Canada during the war of Japanese nationals and 
naturalized persons of the Japanese race in Canada in cases where their 
names [were] referred to the Commission by the Minister of Labour for 
investigation with a view to recommending whether in the circumstances 
of any such case such person should be deported"110. At the request of 
the Minister of Labour, the Commission could inquire into the case of any 
naturalized British subject of the Japanese race who had made a request 
for repatriation and make recommendations as it might deem advisable. 
And any person of the Japanese race who was recommended for deporta-
tion by the Commission would be deemed subject to deportation under 
Order in Council 7355. Any such person recommended for deportation 
would cease to be either a British subject or a Canadian national, "as 
and from the date on which he le[ft] Canada in the course of such 
deportation"1". 
3. The Supreme Court of Canada and the Orders in Council. 
The validity of the three Orders in Council was submitted to the 
Supreme Court of Canada by the Governor-General in Council"2. The 
question presented was whether the three Orders were ' 'ultra vires of the 
Governor in Council in whole or in part and, if so, in what particular or 
particulars and to what extent?""3. 
Although it was sharply divided on the validity of various provisions 
of the three Orders, the Supreme Court held that they contained legisla-
tion which could have been adopted by the Parliament of Canada. Furth-
ermore, it held that under the War Measures Act "the Governor in Coun-
cil was empowered to adopt any legislation that Parliament could have 
adopted; that such legislation was expressly and impliedly adopted be-
109. For the full text of this Order, see Ibid., 257. 258. 
110. The full text of this Order appears at Ibid., 258, 259. 
111. Ibid.. 258. 
112. For the full text of the reference see Ibid.. 252-254. 
113. Ibid., 252. 
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cause it was deemed necessary or advisable for the security, defence, 
peace, order and welfare of Canada by reason of the existence of war; that 
the Governor in Council was the sole judge of the necessity or advisability 
of these measures and [that] it [was] not competent to any Court to 
canvass the considerations which may have led the Governor in Council 
to deem such orders necessary or advisable for the objectives set 
forth""4. 
As the Court reached its decision, five of the seven Justices who 
heard the case wrote opinions both for themselves and others as they 
stated their respective positions. Chief Justice Rinfret and Justices Ker-
win and Taschereau considered the Orders in Council not ultra vires the 
Governor in Council either in whole or in part. With the exception of the 
part of Number 7355 which related to the wives of persons ordered de-
ported and their children under sixteen years of age, Justices Hudson and 
Estey thought the Orders not ultra vires. Justice Rand thought the Orders 
intra vires except for the parts that related to the compulsory deportation 
of natural born British subjects resident in Canada, and the part which 
related to wives and children under sixteen. Justice Kellock thought that 
these two same parts of Order 7355 were ultra vires. Justices Rand and 
Kellock thought that parts of both Orders 7356 and 7357 were ultra vires 
in some respects115. 
4. The Privy Council and the Orders in Council. 
Thus, a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada had found invalid 
the part of Order Number 7355 which related to the wives and children 
under sixteen of persons ordered deported. But once the case reached the 
Privy Council, that body was of the opinion that a determination of the 
Orders "as a whole" was necessary to arrive at a conclusion on the 
matters before it in the appeal. Forthat reason, their Lordships proposed 
to deal with the Orders "in their entirety"116. Then, citing Fort Frances 
Pulp & Power Co. v. Manitoba Free Press Co.117, the law was said to be 
undisputed118. Under the Provisions of the British North America Act, 
property and civil rights in the Provinces were committed to the Provin-
114. See opinion of the Chief Justice at Ibid., 265, 267. 
115. For a summary of the various positions taken by the individual Justices, see the Privy 
Council's opinion in the case, Co-Operative Commtteee on Japanese Canadians v. 
Attorney-Gereral for Canada, [1947] A.C. 87, 93-94. 
116. Ibid., p . 101. 
117. [1923] A.C. 695. 
118. [1947] A.C. 87, 101. 
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cial Legislatures. On the other hand, in a sufficiently great emergency 
such as that arising out of wars, the Dominion Parliament had to be left 
with considerable freedom to judge what those interests were. Yet, if it 
was clear that no emergency had arisen or no longer existed, there could 
be no justification "for the exercise or continued exercise of the excep-
tional powers"119. But, even when the question was whether a measure 
was ultra vires, very clear evidence that an emergency had not arisen or 
no longer existed was required"120. 
By way of corollary, it was added that it was "not pertinent to the 
judiciary to consider the wisdom or the propriety" of a particular policy 
embodied in emergency legislation121. It was also observed that when 
considering a question of ultra vires, the judiciary was not concerned with 
whether or not the executive would, in fact, be able to carry into effective 
operation the emergency provisions which the Dominion Parliament had 
either directly or indirectly made122. 
The validity of the War Measures Act had not been attacked, but that 
of the Orders had. Forthat reason, the Privy Council considered not only 
the points advanced in behalf of the appellants, but also any other grounds 
on which the Orders could be criticised. And as it proceeded to examine 
the Orders, it noted that for Orders to be valid "it is necessary first, that 
on the true construction of the War Measures Act, they fall within the 
ambit of the powers duly conferred by the Act on the Governor in Coun-
cil, second, that, assuming the orders were within the terms of the War 
Measures Act, they were not for some reason in law invalid"123. Then, 
point by point and objection by objection, the Privy Council proceeded to 
consider the Orders and find them all valid. 
First, there was the point that, in its true construction, the War 
Measures Act did not authorize Orders for the deportation of British or 
Canadian nationals, and that in some respects the Act should receive "a 
limited construction"124. It was argued that as a matter of the construc-
tion of the Act, certain limitations were implied. The Colonial Laws Va-
lidity Act, 1865, was pointed to as one such limitation—that by that Act the 
ambit of Orders made pursuant to the War Measures Act had to be con-
fined to Orders which would not be repugnant to the British Nattonality 
and Status of Aliens Act, 1914-18, an Act of the Imperial Parliament. This 
119. Ibid. 
IzU. Iola., pp. IU1, IU»2 
121. Ibid.. p. lUz. 
122. Ibid. 
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was rejected on the basis that it was the date when the delegated power 
was exercised, not the date when the War Measures Act was passed, that 
mattered in so far as the 1865 Act was concerned. For, it was said, the 
statutory law of the United Kingdom is not static and there was no reason 
to impute that the Parliament of Canada had legislated on the basis that 
this law is static. 
Another point was that the War Measures Act did not authorize 
Orders that had an extra-territorial effect as deportation must. But this 
was shortly disposed of with the statement, "Extra-territorial constraint 
is incident to the exercise of the power of deportation"125. And if that was 
not sufficient, there was the Canadian Extra—Territorial Act, 1933126. 
A third argument was that the War Measures Act should be con-
strued as authorizing only such Orders as were "consistent with the ac-
cepted principles of international law" which, it was claimed, would not 
support Orders that would mean the forcible removal of British subjects 
to a foreign country127. Their Lordships were willing to accord some 
weight to such an argument in an appropriate case, but they found that the 
principles on which that argument rested had no place in the construction 
of the War Measures Act, an Act which vested powers in time of war, 
invasion, and actual or apprehended insurrection. 
The next argument involved the meaning of the word "deportation". 
It was argued that as used in the Act it meant that only "aliens" fell within 
the category of persons who could be deported. After noting that dic-
tionaries did not altogether agree on the meaning of "deportation", the 
Privy Council accepted that of the Oxford English Dictionary which de-
fined the word as "the action of carrying away; forcible removal, espe-
cially into exile; transportation"128. It then took the view that as a matter 
of language, the word "deportation" was not misused when applied to 
persons who were not aliens, and that whether or not in its application it 
was confined to aliens depended on the construction of the statute in 
which it was found. As for its use in the War Measures Act an Act 
directed to dealing with emergencies and phrased in sweeping terms, the 
word appeared in a combination that lumped together "arrest, detention, 
exclusion and deportation". Therefore, it was used in the general sense 
and was applicable to all persons "irrespective of nationality"129 It was 
125. Ibid., p. 104. 
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applicable to all persons who at the time were subject to the laws of 
Canada. 
The Privy Council had no trouble whatever with whether the War 
Measures Act authorized the making of an Order which provided that 
deported persons should cease to be either British subjects or Canadian 
nationals. In the light of the views that it had already expressed and under 
the general power granted by Section 3 of the Act, it mattered not what 
the nationality of a person ordered deported was. 
The next question considered by the Privy Council was whether the 
Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, applied to Orders of the Governor in 
Council. In deciding this it rejected the contention that the Orders were 
not law to which the Statute of Westminster, 1931 and the limitation 
which it imposed on the authority of the Parliament of the United King-
dom to legislate for the Dominions, applied130. These orders were made 
through the machinery set up by the Parliament for that purpose. There-
fore, at the time they were made, the legislative activity of Parliament was 
present and that made them "law" as of the date of their promulgation. 
As for the provision of Order Number 7355 which authorized the 
deportation of the wives and children under sixteen of persons for whom 
an order for deportation was made, there was some incompleteness in the 
recitals of the statute. The Order did not show that this was thought 
necessary for the security, peace, order, defence or welfare of Canada. 
But the Privy Council found that to be "of no moment" since, in its 
opinion, it was the substance of the matter which had to be considered, 
and there was not apparent any matter which justified the judiciary in 
coming to the conclusion that the power "was in fact exercised for an 
unauthorized purpose"131. The primary concern of the Governor in 
Council was the deportation of those mentioned in the first part of the 
Order in Council, but it was not a proper inference from the terms of the 
subsections of the Order that the Governor in Council did not deem it 
advisable for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada to 
also order the deportation of wives and children under sixteen of these 
persons. 
The Privy Council was no more impressed than the Supreme Court of 
Canada had been with the argument that at the time the National 
Emergency Transitional Powers Act, 1946, was passed no emergency 
existed which justified the Parliament of Canada to empower the Gover-
130. 22 Geo. V. c. 4 (U.K.). An Act to give effect to certain resolutions passed by Imperial 
Conferences held in the years 1926 and 1930. 
131. Pp. 107-108 of the Privy Council's opinion, Loc. cit. supra note 115. 
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nor in Council to continue the Orders in question. Hostilities had ended, 
but the preamble to the Transitional Act stated clearly why it was thought 
necessary to enact such a statute. The matter was said to be governed by 
the principles laid down in Fort Frances Pulp & Power Co. v. Manitoba 
Free Press Co. which clearly supported the Parliament's power to enact 
such a law132. 
The final argument was that the words "of the Japanese race" were 
so vague "as to be incapable of application to ascertainable persons". 
However, this argument was very summarily disposed of in the simple 
statement "that in their Lordships' opinion they [were] not"133. 
None of the Orders in Council were found ultra vires. 
AFTERMATH AND CONCLUSION 
On February 19,1976, Gerald R. Ford, President of the United States, 
signed Proclamation 4417 which confirmed the termination of Executive 
Order number 9066 dated December 7, 1941, that had authorized the 
internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II. As he signed 
this Proclamation, President Ford noted that Executive Order number 
9066 ceased to be effective with the end of World War II134. However, he 
also noted that because there was no formal statement of the termination 
of the 1941 Executive Order, "there remains some concern among 
Japanese-Americans that there yet may be some life in that obsolete 
document"135. He expressed the conviction that the Proclamation which 
he was signing "should remove all doubt on that matter"136. 
At first blush it would seem shocking that, at this late date, it should 
be thought even remotely necessary that there should be a document such 
as Proclamation 4417 to reassure any American of his security and well-
being. For, as President Ford had signed the proclamation he had spoken 
in part as follows137: 
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We now know what we should have known then—not only was that evacuation 
wrong, but Japanese-Americans were and are loyal Americans. On the battlefield 
and at home the names of Japanese-Americans have been and continue to be 
written in America's history for the sacrifices and the contributions they have 
made to the well-being and to the security of this, our common nation. 
Yet, it should be remembered that at the time the internment of 
persons of Japanese ancestry took place during World War II in both the 
United States and Canada, there were strong and influential voices that 
expressed full support for the now lamented event that was taking place. 
On the American scene, one of the strongest voices was that of Earl 
Warren who was then Attorney General of California, later became Gov-
ernor of California, and then was named Chief Justice of the United 
States138. 
On the Canadian scene, it has been written that the internment of 
Japanese-Canadians has been justified on the basis that "the Americans 
forced our hands"139. But however true or false that may be, at the time 
of the Pearl Harbor attack, organized public opinion in British Columbia 
was more anti-Japanese than ever and very influential. American influ-
ence was not needed for British Columbians to urge the complete evacua-
tion of Japanese-Canadians from Canada's West Coast which eventually 
took place140. As professor La Violette pointed out in his book on the 
World War II Japanese-Canadian question, "British Columbia had its 
own motives"141. 
Viewed in retrospect, the treatment which persons of Japanese ances-
try received in both the United States and Canada during World War II 
confirms the belief that, in times of stress and grave national emergency, 
even the most rational and the fairest of men can forget the rights of 
others and do strange things. And when that happens, the presence or 
absence of a Bill of Rights does not seem to matter—not even the pres-
ence of one that is as firmly entrenched in a constitutional framework as is 
that of the Constitution of the United States. Perhaps at least a partial 
explanation for this can be found in Justice Louis D. Brandeis' statement 
in Olmstead v. United States when he wrote in a different context: "The 
138. See Hearings Pursuant to H. Res. 113, Select Committee Investigating National De-
fense Migration, U.S. House of Representatives, Seventy-Seventh Congress, Second 
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greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, 
well-meaning, but without understanding"142. But such an explanation, 
and certainly it must be considered a valid one, can hardly be reassuring 
to even a Mrs. Shig Nishio who, twenty-one years later, was willing to 
dismiss her experience as a World War II Japanese-American internee 
with the statement: "There is no bitterness now. It was just something 
that happened"143. 
142. Brandeis, J., dissenting, 277 U.S. 438. 472 et 479 (1928). 
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